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Abstract: Regulation and protection have been the 
major issues to prevent the consumers from enjoying 
good quality of service (QoS) at reasonable prices, for 
example, electricity and long distance call service.  
Deregulation in such industries started in early 1970s 
and have achieved significant results in, for example, 
telecommunication industry.   The deregulation in 
telecommunication was mainly focused on reducing 
the market power to add more competition to reduce 
the price and to improve QoS. 
 
Similarly, the power industry in several countries also 
underwent regulation.   The power industry used to be 
protected and regulated.  Consumers were forced to 
buy electricity from particular suppliers and suffered 
high prices and low QoS. After deregulation, the 
original boundary lines have been removed and 
consumers have more alternatives.  How to support 
optimal planning of cross-border electricity trade has 
become an important issue since then. 
Decentralization, or participants have the rights to 
participate in decision making, is one of the directions 
of deregulation. 
  
In this paper a decentralized structure is suggested to 
solve the problem by using multi-agent technology to 
create autonomy for each participant. In such structure 
the centralization of information transmission or 
decision making is prevented.  Each participant 
behaves rationally to search for best benefit or payoff 
through the information she or he owns or through 
information exchange with other participants. 
Although all the market participants make decisions 
to protect their own benefits, the optimal solution 
(total costs) of the whole system can be achieved 
finally. This structure is based on the method 
proposed in [5] and implementation, which a multi-
agent system called Multi-Agent System for Cross-
Border Trade (MASCBT), was done by using Java 
programming language. A demonstration on a 5-area 
test system shows that the suggested new approach is 
effective and promising. 
 
Keywords: power market, cross-border trade plan, 
decentralized optimization, multi-agent technology 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Regulation and protection had created the 
opportunities for companies in several industries to 
generate high profits to keep them growing.  However, 
in order to create such protection, the consumers had 
to pay the high price and suffer low quality of service 
(QoS). Electricity and long distance call service were 
the major targets of deregulation.  Deregulation was 
introduced in early 1970s and had achieved 
significant results in telecommunication.   After 
AT&T was forced to split and more competitors 
joined the market, consumers had more choices and 
the market power has significantly decreased.  
 
Similarly, the power industry in several countries also 
underwent deregulation.   The power industry used to 
be protected and regulated.  Consumers were forced 
to buy electricity from particular suppliers at higher 
prices and with lower QoS. After deregulation, the 
original boundary lines have been removed and 
consumers have more alternatives.   For example, the 
deregulation act in California allowed its consumers 
to purchase electricity from other states. How to 
support optimal planning of cross-border electricity 
trade has become an important issue. Decentralization, 
or participants, such as, owners of power generators, 
owners of transmission lines, and consumers, have the 
rights to participate in decision making, is one of the 
directions of deregulation.  How to develop a 
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negotiation support system to support such 
decentralized decision making is important. 
Internet and related technologies also supported 
the shaping of the new market structure, where more 
and more information or decisions are transmitted 
through Internet.  Which increase the transparency 
and efficiency of market operation.  Such 
transparency or efficiency significantly decreased the 
market power and made consumers enjoyed more 
from what they paid. 
Usually an interconnected power system consists 
of several regional networks that connected with tie-
lines. Under transmission open access, the electricity 
trade inside a regional system can be handled locally. 
While the electricity trades among regional systems 
should pay for the usage of tie lines and the regional 
networks along the transaction paths. It is clear that 
wholesale cross-border trades should be considered 
together with the transmission cost in advance with 
the limits of the tie line capacities included. In this 
paper, we use the European network as an example to 
study the wholesale cross-border trade planning.  But 
the considerations are equally applicable to all the 
interconnected networks world wide. 
 
Electricity production in the European Union (EU) 
has, for decades, been based on monopoly production 
and 15 separate national markets. Community 
Directive 96/92/EC has brought about a change to 
develop the common electricity market in Europe [1]. 
However there were several considerations about how 
to develop the common rules of transmission open 
access: (1) In order to schedule such wholesale cross-
border trade, a central transmission system operator 
(TSO) seemed to be necessary to collect all the 
information and to perform the needed calculations. 
Although for system security purposes it seemed to be 
necessary, the member TSOs may be opposed to this 
idea mostly for political reasons. (2) It is hard to ask 
for extreme equality when the national transmission 
systems facing native demands and foreign demands 
at the same time. How to obtain the optimum with the 
consideration of priority? 
 
Generally there are two basic approaches to 
handle the wholesale cross-border trade schedule. One 
is the central schedule approach, where the market 
operator is responsible for working out an optimal 
cross-border transmission schedule at minimum 
transmission cost that considers the system operation 
constraints, and then allocates the cost to individual 
transactions. Centralized optimization methods can be 
used for the first task, such as Ref. [2] and [3]. Very 
often market participants might doubt the fairness of 
such centrally announced results. Besides the central 
optimization has to be re-calculated whenever a new 
transaction is added. The other approach is the 
decentralized schedule, which uses the invisible 
market hand to solve the problem by market 
participants themselves. One such implementation [4] 
uses the Bilateral Shapley Value to negotiate in 
multilateral trades via a multi-agent system. This 
approach avoids the centralized decision making of 
the market operator and is quite attractive to market 
participants. However the optimal social welfare is 
not guarantied. In Ref. [5], a decentralized method is 
suggested base on ‘first come, first serve’ rule to 
implement the cross-border trade planning with the 
help of multi-agent technology. However in order to 
keep the system security and improve the speed, a 
central sever is still required.  
  
In this paper, we propose a decentralized structure 
based on the method discussed in [5]. In the new 
structure, the centralized information collection is 
prevented and each regional system acts rationally 
based on local information to search its own benefits. 
However the total transmission cost is minimized 
after such self-protective decisions. The significant 
advantage of this structure lies in that it is based on 
each participant’s rational behavior and any super 
controller can be avoided. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: in next section, 
we shall first present the mathematical model of the 
problem in its centralized optimal format. Then the 
decentralized approach will be introduced. In section 
III, we provide the detailed model of multi-agent 
system. System implementations and complexities 
will be introduced in Section IV. In section V, a 5-
area system will be used as an example to illustrate 
the negotiations among participants. Conclusions are 
made in the last section. 
 
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
 
The basic assumptions used in our research are: 
(a) The transmission price of each tie line is a 
constant and announced in $per unit power flow. 
The transmission limits of tie lines are known in 
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per unit. For simplicity, the transmission loss is 
neglected (Its cost can be included approximately 
into the tie line transmission price) and the power 
flow of each tie line is controllable.  
(b) An area is clarified as supply, demand or transit 
area if its net injection power Pi is greater than, 
less than or equal to zero. Pi,max is the net injection 
capacity of area i when Pi>0. The net generation 
capacity Pi,max for a supply area and the load 
demand of a demand area are all known.  
(c) There are enough generation capacities to meet 
the load demands in the entire inter-connected 
system and the tie-line capacity is enough such 
that all the demands can be satisfied via proper 
schedule.  
 
For the wholesale cross-border trades scheduling 
problem, the math model for the centralized optimal 
decision can be formulated as follows: 
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where  
fij :  power flow on the tie-line from region i to 
region j, and fij>0;  
fij,max :  capacity of the lie-line from region i to region 
j;  
cij :  price of per unit power flow for usage of tie-
line (i,j); 
ti :  price of per unit power flow for usage of 
network of area i; 
S, D, T: denote supply, demand and transit area sets 
respectively;  
A :  entire tie line set with m directed tie-line flows;  
n :  total number of areas. 
 
The three terms of the objective function in (1) are 
the total costs for tie-lines usage; the total fees for 
usage of all supply area networks; and the total fees 
for the usage of other area networks respectively. It 
should be noticed that the generation cost is not 
included in the objective function for simplicity. 
There is no difficulty to include generation cost of 
each supply area into the problem. This is realized 
through introducing a fictitious ‘supply area - tie line’ 
set with the tie line transmission price equal to the 
generation cost of the supply area and the original 
supply area becomes a ‘transit’ area in the new system. 
 
Init ial ization: f ij :=0
for  any  demand i :
(1)  search for  the cheapest  path f rom any
      avaible generat ion area j ;
(2)  get  suppl ied wi th the feasible quant i ty;
(3)  update the corresponding f ij ;
a l l  the demands in
the who le  sys tem
are suppl ied?
output  f ij
Y
N
i := one of  the un-
se rved  demands
 
Figure1: flow chart of the decentralized approach 
 
A decentralized approach is proposed in Ref. [5] 
to solve the linear optimization problem (1). The basic 
idea is that within each round of iteration, one 
demand i searches for the cheapest path to get 
supplied from any available generation area j. The 
quantity of the supply is the minimal value of 
following three parameters: the un-served demand of 
area i, the available generating capacity of area j, and 
the available transmission capacity of path from area j 
to area i. This process is repeated again and again all 
the loads in the whole system are totally satisfied. The 
flow chart is shown in figure 1. Using the inductive 
method, we proved that the final flow of the network 
from the decentralized approach above is the same as 
that from the centralized optimization defined in (1). 
Detailed algorithm and proof can be found in [5]. 
 
The advantages of the new approach are apparent:  
(a) There is no need for a central coordinator. Each 
demand area searches for the cheapest path to 
satisfy its own need.  
(b) Every demand area is satisfied with its choice 
based on the available cheapest path and doesn’t 
need to worry about the bias from central 
processing. 
(c) The minimal total transmission cost can still be 
guaranteed at the end with system constraints 
satisfied. 
(d) When a new trade is added, previous trade 
schedules will not change. This is extremely 
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attractive as compared with centralized 
optimization approaches. 
(e) The new approach does not need transmission 
cost allocation calculation since it can obtain 
transmission cost of each trade during the 
process. 
(f) The area power generation cost can also be 
included easily by introducing a fictitious ‘supply 
area - tie line’ set as mentioned before. 
 
III. MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM MODELING 
init ial ization
cheapest  path
search
cheapest  path
negot iat ion
terminat ion
n
e
w
 r
o
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n
d
any  more
load to be
suppl ied?
N
Y
 
Figure 2: Functional Framework of the Multi-agent 
System 
 
In our model each regional network is assumed to 
be a rational agent, who only has partial information, 
including the identity numbers of itself and the 
immediate neighbors, and the data of the tie-lines 
incident to itself, such as prices, capacities, and the 
existing flows. Each agent is responsible for updating 
related local information. We also assume that the 
communicate channels are perfect. 
 
There are two major functions in the system by the 
communication of the agents. One is the cheapest path 
searching, the other is the cheapest path negotiation. 
The functional framework of this multi-agent system 
is shown in figure 2. 
 
Initialization: 
 Each agent collects the local information and 
sends the synchronizing message. 
 
Cheapest path search: 
A generic label-correcting algorithm [6] is 
modified to compute the cheapest path by 
successively updating the cost labels. Each agent 
maintains a set of cost labels p(.) at every stage. The 
label p(j) is either ∝, indicating that it has yet to 
discover a directed path from the source to agent j, or 
it is the cost of some directed path from the source to 
agent j. For each agent j a predecessor index, pred(j), 
is also maintained which records the agent prior to 
agent j in the current directed path of cost p(j). At 
termination, predecessor indices allow each agent to 
trace the cheapest path from the source node back to 
agent j. Detailed algorithm can be found in Ref. [6].  
 
Cheapest path negotiation: 
After each agent knows the identity number of its 
preceding agent along the cheapest path, it will send 
the message to the preceding agent for the usage of 
that regional network. There are three actions for a 
rational agent when receiving such request: (1) selfish 
plan when the receiver is a deficit agent, i.e., to 
decline the requests and refuse other agents to use its 
own regional networks until its own loads are fully 
supplied; (2) modest plan when the receiver is a 
balanced agent, i.e., to pass on the received requests 
to the preceding agent on the cheapest path and allow 
other agents to use its own regional networks by 
charging transit fees. (3) ego-centric plan when the 
receiver is a excess agent, i.e., to accept the requests 
based on the rule of “first come and first serve” and 
allow other agents to use its own networks. 
 
Termination: 
When no agent sends request to other agents, that 
means all the loads are supplied, then the system 
terminates. 
 
The advantages of this model lie in that: 
(a) There is no centralized owner or controller of the 
global information about the network. Therefore, 
any agent does not depend on the centralized 
information to make decisions. 
(b) Each agent only has local information. Therefore 
it knows neither the global structure of the network, 
nor the numbers of agents in the network. This 
structure is quite attractive to develop a 
competitive market. 
(c) The minimum transmission cost could be achieved 
by communication and cooperation among all 
agents. 
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(d) Each agent is satisfied with its choice since all the 
trades are resulted from rational behavior. 
 
IV. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Agent Agent Agent
INTERNET
Agent Name Server
......
 
 
Figure 3 infrastructure of MASCBT 
 
We have implemented a multi-agent system on the 
Internet  Multi-Agent System for Cross-Border 
Trade (MASCBT). Fig. 3 shows the infrastructure of 
MASCBT. Agent communication is done via the 
Internet. The agent name server provides agent 
registration service and the Internet connections for 
all agents. Fig. 4 shows a java applet and represents 
the agent E of the test system in Section V. The agent 
name and password are used to register the agent into 
the agent name server. 
 
 
Figure 4 Applet of agent E 
The execution time to process a message is always 
O(1) in MASCBT. The worst case of execution in 
MASCBT is that each agent processes a message 
sequentially. Therefore, the time complexity of 
MASCBT equals to that of the message complexity. 
Hence we only need to analyze the message 
complexity. 
The cheapest path computation needs to be 
executed one time within a round of negotiations. The 
message complexity of the cheapest path computation 
is O(m2n). There are at most O(nDmax) rounds of 
negotiation in MASCBT, where Dmax is the largest 
demand of a given network. Finally, we can conclude 
that the message complexity and time complexity of 
MASCBT is O(m2n2Dmax). (The time complexity will 
be much better in practice because all the agents may 
execute concurrently). Therefore the performance of 
the system is satisfactory. 
 
V. COMPUTER RESULTS 
A 5-area test system [7] (see Fig. 5) is used for 
computer test and to show how our method works 
based on multi-agent technology.  
A (2) B (8) C (4)
D (4)
E (4)
800
500
3001000
(1,1100) (4,800) (3,800)
(2,200)(1,200)(2,900)
 
Figure 5 the test system schematic diagram 
In Fig. 5 each bigger circle represents a regional 
network connected by tie lines to other networks. The 
number inside a circle represents the assumed 
transmission cost of per unit flow for transit through 
the regional systems. Each tie line has two parameters 
put in a parenthesis. The first number represents the 
transmission cost for per unit flow and the second 
number the transmission capacity of the tie line. The 
number by the side of a generator (or a demand) 
means the available generation capability (or the 
amount of load demand).  
 
Region A and B are net exporters, they will 
execute the egocentric plan. Region D and E are net 
importers, so we assume they will execute the selfish 
plan when they are deficit, and then execute the 
modest plan when they become balanced. Region C is 
a transmit region with no net import/export, so it 
executes the modest plan. 
 
1st round 
The cheapest path from an excess agent (i.e., agent 
B) to agent D is the path B-D and the cheapest path 
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from agent B to agent E is the path B-D-E. E sends a 
request to D to augment a flow of 800 units, and D 
sends a request to B to augment a flow of 500 units. 
Because agent D is deficit area executing a selfish 
plan, it will reject the request from agent E to 
augment a flow via agent D. While agent B is an 
excess agent who executes the egocentric plan. So B 
will accept the request by augmenting available 300 
units through networks of B to agent D, as illustrated 
by figure 6(a). 
A (2) B (8) C (4)
D (4)
E (4)
800
500
3001000
(1,1100) (4,800) (3,800)
(2,200)(1,200)(2,900)
300
 
(a) Cost of trade B-D: (8+2+4)×300=4200 
200
A (2) B (8) C (4)
D (4)
E (4)
800
200
1000
(1,1100) (4,800) (3,800)
(2,200)(1,200)
(2,600)
  
(b) Cost of trade A-B-D: (2+1+8+2+4)×200=3400 
A (2) B (8) C (4)
D (4)
E (4)
800
800
(1,1100) (4,800) (3,800)
(2,200)(1,200)(2,400) 200
 
(c) Cost of trade A-B-D-E: 
(2+1+8+2+4+2+4)×200=4600 
A (2) B (8) C (4)
D (4)
E (4)
600
600
(1,900) (4,800) (3,800)
(2,0)(1,200)(2,200)
600
 (d) Cost of trade A-B-C-E: 
(2+1+8+4+4+3+4)×600=15600 
A (2) B (8) C (4)
D (4)
E (4)
800
500
3001000
1000 600 600
200
0
700
 
(e) Final solution of flows 
Figure 6 Illustration of negotiation process 
2nd round 
After the 1st round, the cheapest path from an 
excess agent (i.e., agent A) to agent D is the path A-
B-D and the cheapest path from agent A to agent E is 
the path A-B-D-E. Because agent D still is a deficit 
agent who is executing the selfish plan, it rejects the 
request from agent E to augment a flow via agent D. 
While agent B is a balanced agent who is executing 
the modest plan. It then passes agent D’s request to A. 
Owing to the egocentric plan, agent A then approves 
the request to augment a flow of 200 units from agent 
A to agent D, as illustrated by figure 6(b). 
3rd round 
After the 2nd round, the cheapest path from the 
excess agent A to agent E is the path A-B-D-E. Since 
agent D becomes balanced, now all the agents (except 
A) along the path are the balanced agents who will 
execute modest plans. So the request sent by E is 
passed on until it reaches A. Furthermore, all the 
regional networks along the path could be used at a 
transit fee. Because of the congestion of tie-line D-E, 
only 200 units are augmented from agent A to agent E, 
as illustrated by figure 6(c). 
4th round 
After the 3rd round, since the tie-line D-E has been 
fully used, the cheapest path from the excess agent A 
to agent E now is the path A-B-C-E. The balanced 
agents along the path (except A) merely pass on the 
requests received to their predecessors until agent A 
gets the request. As the excess agent executing 
egocentric plan, A then approves the request to 
augment 600 units from agent A to agent D, as 
illustrated by figure 6(d). 
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Table 1: Cost Allocation (in money units) 
 
Cost flow Payment for 
service 
Income from 
service 
A 0 2000 
B 0 10400 
C 0 2400 
D 7600 2800 
Area 
Network 
E 20200 3200 
A-B 0 1000 
B-C 0 2400 
C-E 0 1800 
B-D 0 1400 
C-D 0 0 
Tie line 
E-D 0 400 
Total 27800 27800 
 
When negotiations end, the wholesale cross-border 
trades are finalized, and so is the cost of the trades. 
The final flow of trades for the whole system is 
shown in Fig. 6(e), and it is easy to check that the 
optimal cost of 27800 for the problem (1) is also 
achieved. A summary of the trade costs is listed in 
Table 1. Totally agent D needs to pay 
3400+4200=7600 by receiving 300-units power from 
agent B and 200-units power from agent A, while 
agent E needs to pay 4600+15600=20200 by 
receiving 800-units power from agent A going 
through two different paths. It is easy to prove the 
cost allocation result is the equilibrium point of the 
non-cooperative game for these five players [8]. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this paper, we have proposed a decentralized 
structure to support negotiation of cross-border trade 
planning and cost allocation by using multi-agent 
technology.  The major difference between this 
system and our earlier research is in the rule base that 
owned by each agent and the communication protocol. 
In this system, each agent represents a regional 
network, which acts rationally to protect its own 
benefit by contacting and negotiation with 
neighboring agents to search for the best or cheapest 
path to transmit electricity. Although each agent does 
not receive any centralized information to guarantee 
the autonomous behavior, the minimum cost of the 
whole system is achieved finally. This structure 
provides a theoretical basis to support the solving of 
similar problems. For example, after China and 
Taiwan join World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
border should be open to support cross-border trading.  
How to allocate the cost of building new transmission 
or delivery channel as well as how to schedule the 
trade.  Such system will be helpful to support such 
negotiation or even to semi-automate the negotiation 
process.  
 
The other problem that can be solved by such 
system is the transmission of video-on-demand (VOD) 
across borders of different VOD service provider.  
VOD and power transmission, to some extend, have 
several characteristics in common, for example, 
congestion management.  It is very difficult to set up 
buffer to store such signals once the transmission 
started.  Therefore, negotiation for cross-border 
transmission and how to allocate the cost to guarantee 
the needed bandwidth is important.  
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